Post by Goswin von Brederlow Post by Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña
If spam e-mail is going to start closing our Bugs in the BTS then we
start thinking about implementing authentication checks in the BTS...
for example: do not allow control messages or -close messages with no
attached (valid) GPG/PGP signatures (from a valid developer?)"
NMs and most submitters aren't in the keyring so they would have a
hard time managing bugs if a DD signature is required.
The requirement for a valid signature might not be 'valid signature = DD
signature' but something more liberal like 'valid signature = signature
in the web of trust' (i.e. either a DD or signed by a DD) or even more
liberal like 'valid signature = signature in known keyservers'. In the
later, spammers could get keys generated and submitted there but they
are not really targetting our BTS, it's backscatter from their spam tricks.
Post by Goswin von Brederlow
And don't forget the DAK closing bugs on uploads. The archive key
would have to be allowed to sign too.
Or the BTS mail interface could approve messages coming in directly from
the ftp-master system, in any case, adding the archive key would not be
an issue, probably.
I don't know if the BTS admins are going to go forward with any of these
but IMHO it doesn't make any sense to allow administrative access
(managing, retitling, tagging, etc.) to the BTS without any kind of
authentication attempts (even if "simple") of the end user when in most
situations it's somebody the project knows about, not Random Joe.
Maybe the BTS admins are tracking abuse somehow, I haven't digged into
the BTS code at all but I do remember some abuse in the past and people
being shunted off. However, with the current state of affairs, is there
anything that prevents somebody from sending fake e-mails (maybe using
relay proxies) to the BTS using random mail To's to (1-close to
319400-close _AT_ bugs.debian.org ? Just wondering...
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